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In this paper we provide our first econometric estimates of the effect of worker participation in 
decision-making, ownership and profits on productive efficiency. Participation has the potential 
for exerting several conflicting influences on firm performance simultaneously. As a result both 
the direction and magnitude of its impact are empirical issues. Previous studies have empirically 
measured the impact of each of these forms of participation; however, no prior study has 
controlled for the influence of the other forms. Because of the potential for correlation among 
these forms of participation, it is possible that omitted variables bias has affected the previous 
results. Using a new panel data set with simultaneous measures of all four types of participation 
in U.S. manufacturing establishments, we model participation as disembodied technical change, 
and estimate production function coefficients for each type while controlling for the others. We 
use both OLS and instrumental variables in order to guard against potential simultaneity. The 
IV results indicate that participation in decision-making has a large positive productivity effect 
while the impacts of unionization and profit-sharing depend upon regression specification. 
Moderate amounts of indirect worker ownership affect productivity positively, while the 
estimated effect of direct worker ownership is negative. However, this last result may reflect the 
industrial concentration of the direct ownership firms in our sample. 
1. Introduction 
In both capitalist and socialist countries, there has been substantial growth 
of and increasing interest in participative organizations over the past 20 
years. In spite of these developments, there is still relatively little published 
information on how participatory firms are organized and how they perform. 
Only recently have there been published results about the effects of increased 
participation on firm performance,l and there remains little solid information 
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(1985), Jones and Svejnar (1985) and Estrin, Jones and Svejnar (1987). 
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on whether the effects themselves vary according to the type of firm under 
consideration or the form of participation. Although many advocates stress 
welfare aspects of worker participation in justifying supportive intervention, 
the question of operational efficiency is clearly a crucial and as yet not a 
completely resolved one. In this paper we provide our first econometric 
estimates of the effect of various forms of worker participation on productive 
efficiency. 
In section 2, we briefly discuss the main hypotheses about the productivity 
effects of worker participation in decision-making, ownership and profits and 
indicate some important considerations in estimating these effects and 
drawing general conclusions. In section 3, we present our data set which is 
uniquely suited to analyzing the independent influences of employee partici- 
pation in ownership, profits and decision-making within the firm, while 
controlling for degree of unionization. In this section, we also outline our 
econometric framework for estimating the magnitudes of these effects. In 
section 4 we discuss our econometric results and in section 5 we draw 
conclusions. 
2. Theoretical approach and hypotheses 
As was pointed out in earlier papers [e.g., Jones and Svejnar (1985)], there 
is at present no tight theory which would yield empirical predictions about 
the effects of different forms of worker participation on productive efficiency 
(total factor productivity). The most highly formalized approach to studying 
the performance impact of non-managerial participation in decision-making, 
ownership and profit within the firm is that of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976,1979), who see participation of any type as always having deleterious 
effects on firm performance. Jensen and Meckling’s analysis is based on the 
theory of contractual agency relationships. This approach analyzes the effects 
of primarily explicit contracts specifying the disposition of costs and rewards 
among principles and agents in the firm. The stipulations of these contracts 
in large part determine the behavior of agents in the firm. As a result, it is 
reasonable to formally specify the nature of these intra-firm agreements as an 
element in the firm’s production function. 
Much of the work to date has adopted such a production function 
framework. The particular contribution of Jensen and Meckling’s work is to 
supply a rationale for negative values for the coefficients on the variables 
which measure participatory elements in the firm’s production function. 
According to Jensen and Meckling, the object of external shareholders in a 
corporation is wealth maximization, whereas the object of managers is their 
own utility maximization. Hence, shareholders must monitor the managers, 
which is costly. These monitoring costs increase with the number of agents, 
making a broad dispersion of decision-making rights highly inefficient. It is 
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precisely this broad distribution of decision-making rights which defines the 
participative firm. 
The residual loss will also be greater in participative firms. By definition, 
the greater the number of persons with contractual rights to sharing in 
residual gains, the smaller will be the incentive for each to undertake the 
effort and stress associated with reaping these gains. This element of the 
criticism applies more to profit-sharing and to worker ownership than to the 
sharing of decision-making rights. 
The agency cost framework, based on a model of individual utility 
maximization, leads Jensen and Meckling to conclude that participative 
arrangements are inevitably inefficient. However, adopting a similar frame- 
work, but one based on collusive group behavior, leads other authors, 
including Thomas and Logan (1982), Vanek (1970), Horvat (1982), and Cable 
and Fitzroy (1980a, b), to conclude just the opposite. Cable and Fitzroy 
(1980b) predict ‘a positive collusion to maximize joint wealth’, implying that 
the residual loss will actually be smaller in participative firms than in 
traditional firms due to a greater identification by members of the firm with 
commonly held goals. In part, this argument rests upon extra-economic 
motivations, such as solidarity [emphasized in Vanek (1970)], but it also 
results from decreased monitoring costs [Bradley and Gelb (1981)]. 
Additionally, if there is an asymmetry of information in the firm due to the 
fact that employees have specific knowledge about the workplace and the 
behavior of fellow workers, then participatory schemes may give workers 
greater incentives to provide information to managers. This may result in an 
increase of managerial control over the workplace in spite of the apparent 
yielding of certain elements of traditional managerial discretion. Voluntary 
information sharing may also decrease the costs of monitoring workers. 
The phenomenon of increased total control in participative firms has been 
noted and subjected to measurement in the social-psychological literature 
[Tannenbaum (1974)], while the lowering of monitoring costs in participative 
environments has proven to be measurably present in the Mondragon 
cooperatives in Spain [Bradley and Gelb (1981)]. 
These arguments indicate that the observed effect of increased partici- 
pation in decision-making, ownership and profits on firm performance is a 
composite of conflicting effects and that its direction and magnitude are 
empirical issues. 
Several features of the participatory firms make estimation empirically 
complex. One issue is self-selection, both at the level of the firm and of the 
employee. Most producer cooperatives were started as cooperatives, both in 
Europe and in the U.S. It is therefore safe to regard their ownership status as 
exogenous (predetermined) for purposes of estimating the effects of ownership 
status. However, only a small percentage of ESOP (employee stock 
ownership plan) and profit-sharing companies in the U.S. were begun with 
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these institutions in place, and hence the presence of these plans may be 
endogenously determined, leading to possible sources of estimation bias. 
Endogeneity is a concern at the employee level as well for coops, although 
not for ESOPs. In ESOP companies, typically all (non-union) employees are 
covered by the plan. However, it is up to workers in cooperative firms 
whether they wish to become members, which typically involves an 
investment in one form or another. Clearly, workers are more apt to make 
this investment when it appears that there will be a positive return, and this 
has obvious implications for obtaining unbiased estimates of the 
participation effect when participation is measured by the ratio of members 
to the total number of workers in the firm. 
Secondly, life-cycle effects are of special concern in those participative firms 
wherein employees participate in ownership. Miyazaki (1984), Ben-Ner (1984) 
and others have discussed this issue, and Estrin and Jones (1987) have been 
able to econometrically detect life-cycle effects for cooperatives in certain 
industries in France. The issue is of particular importance in the U.S., where 
many ESOP companies have become participative as a result of the failure of 
a previously existing conventional firm, and subsequently abandoned em- 
ployee ownership when the firm was restored to profitability. Controlling for 
conditions which affect the adoption of participative agreements is necessary 
to obtain unbiased econometric estimates of the productivity effects of these 
arrangements. 
Thirdly, most of the studies of the performance effects of employee owner- 
ship in the U.S. have adopted profitability as the performance variable. A 
number of interesting results have been reported [see Conte and Tannenbaum 
(1978 and Tannenbaum, Cook and Lohmann (1984)]; however, there are 
numerous problems with profit as a measure of the impact of participation. 
The principal problem is that increased profit performance can come about 
from factors other than increases in efficiency. Especially in the U.S., 
reorganization as an employee-owned company can have substantial tax 
consequences.2 Moreover, even apart from tax effects, changes in organiz- 
ational structure are typically accompanied by higher levels of required debt 
service and requirements to repurchase the stock of retiring employees, which 
serves as a further drain on liquidity. The effects of these and other features 
of employee stock ownership plans on the statement of accounting profit are 
not straightforward, yet they diminish the usefulness of either before-tax or 
after-tax net income as an indicator of efficiency in the firm’s operations. As 
a result, we concentrate on the underlying production function relationships 
to assess the impact of the various forms of participation on performance. 
Our strategy is to specify a flexible production function, capture as best as 
‘See, for example, Lowenstein (1985) for an analysis of the tax consequences of the Dan River 
employee stock ownership plan. 
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we can the relevant participatory variables, and account (control) for the 
presence of the other factors mentioned earlier. 
3. Data and methodology 
Worker participation can be in the form of profit-sharing, individual or 
collective claims to assets of the firm, or a sharing in decision-making rights. 
In addition, workers can influence company policies and day-to-day oper- 
ations via unionization. 
Previous studies have assessed the impact of these varied organizational 
arrangements by comparing performance results from one group (e.g., a 
sample of producer cooperatives) with those from a sample of non- 
participative firms, or by comparing performance results within the group. 
While instructive, this approach does not allow for covariation among the 
participation variables, and opens up possibilities for misspecification and 
omitted variables bias. The importance of this issue is illustrated by our data. 
Our data resulted from a broad ranging effort to sample four populations: 
(1) profit-sharing companies, (2) companies with employee stock ownership 
plans, (3) producer cooperatives in the plywood industry, and (4) companies 
with programs for employee participation but with no employee ownership 
of profit-sharing. For each type of firm, we compiled extensive lists of 
possible contacts from authoritative sources and selected randomly from 
these lists. In the end, we received usable information from 40 companies. 
Responses from companies in group (4) were so limited that we abandoned 
our attempt to include representatives of this group in our sample. 
However, 13 firms in groups (l)-(3) proved to have participatory schemes 
and we are therefore able to estimate the effects of employee participation on 
productivity from our data. Nine of the 40 firms have a positive degree of 
unionization as well. 
It is difticult to judge the representativeness of the firms in our sample in 
relation to the populations from which they were drawn. Hence, we do not 
attempt to excessively generalize our sample to the respective populations. 
However, the sample does reflect the high degree of covariation in partici- 
pative arrangements mentioned above. Of the 11 non-employee-owned protit- 
sharing companies in the sample, 4 indicated the presence of an active 
program of non-managerial employee involvement in decision-making. Of the 
21 firms with ESOPs, 5 had some amount of direct non-managerial employee 
ownership, 7 had profit-sharing plans and 5 had some form of non- 
managerial employee participation in decision-making. 
In each firm, we collected time series data on operations, including 
employment, fixed investment, electricity and fuels usage, sales, purchased 
materials, beginning and ending inventories, and industry (SIC) codes, as well 
as time series information on the value of employee share ownership, both 
directly and through and Employee Stock Ownership Trust, and the total 
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equity value of the firm, from which we were able to construct measures of 
the percentage of company assets owned by non-managerial employees. We 
also collected non-time series data on the formal structures of non- 
managerial participation in decision-making, ownership and profit, as well as 
determining the extent of unionization of non-managerial employees in the 
firm. 
From these data, we constructed three main operating variables: Q = value 
added, L= total hours worked and F = value of electricity and fuels used. 
Since capital measures are questionable and since we were unable to construct 
an adequate direct measure of capital for more than a few of the firms, we 
follow part of the production function literature and use the variable F as a 
proxy for capital services used. 
In addition to Q, L and F, we have constructed several organizational 
variables in order to assess the productivity impact of the various insti- 
tutional (participatory) schemes. The variables that -we use in this paper are: 
ESOT =percentage of company stock owned by non- 
managerial employees indirectly through an employee 
stock ownership trust (ESOT), 
DIRECT OWN =percentage of company stock owned by non- 
managerial employees directly, 
PROFIT =a dummy variable coded 1.0 when the firm offers profit 
sharing to non-managerial employees and 0.0 
otherwise, 
PARTICIPATION =a dummy variable coded 1.0 when the firm has an 
employee participation plan and 0.0 otherwise, 
UNION =percentage of the firm’s labor force that is covered by a 
collective bargaining contract, 
BANKRUPT =a dummy variable coded 1.0 if the reason for starting 
employee ownership was the bankruptcy of the firm 
and 0.0 otherwise, 
PART WAGES =a dummy variable coded 1.0 if the workers have the 
right to participate in decisions over wages and 0.0 
otherwise, 
PART PROD =a dummy variable coded 1.0 if the workers have 
participation in decisions over production and 0.0 
otherwise, 
NO OWNED =a dummy variable coded 1.0 if the firm has no non- 
managerial employee ownership and 0.0 otherwise, 
TIME =a time trend. 
All of these variables are available in at least 2 consecutive years for all 
but 4 of the sampled firms, and for as many as 8 consecutive years for 14 
firms. The means, standard deviations and minimum and maximum values of 
the variables used in the analysis are presented in table 1. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. 
Mean 
Standard Minimum Maximum 
deviation value value 
PROFIT 0.58 0.49 0 1 
PARTICIPATION 0.34 0.48 0 1 
PART WAGES 0.14 0.35 0 1 
PART PROD 0.03 0.18 0 1 
NOOWN 0.42 0.49 0 1 
DIRECT OWN 0.16 0.35 0 1 
ESOT 0.12 0.25 0 1 
UNION 0.15 0.31 0 1 
BANKRUPT 0.02 0.14 0 1 
In L 12.2 1.2 8.0 15 
In F 11.8 1.6 6.9 16 
The strategy that we have adopted to estimate the productivity effects of 
the various schemes is to lit an augmented production function of the form 
where g is the input function, f is the productive efficiency (total factor 
productivity) function and Z is a vector of the institutional variables whose 
effect we want to estimate: Z=(PROFIIT; PARTICIPATION, PART WAGES, 
PART PROD, NO OWN, DIRECT OWN, ESOT, UNION, BANKRUPT). 
To operationalize eq. (1) we have taken the g function to be of the transcen- 
dental logarithmic (translog) form and we allow f to enter in a disembodied 
way, 
In Q = tag + @I In L + CQ In F + a,(ln L)2 + a,(ln F)’ 
+ a,(ln L)(ln F) + P,Z + E. (2) 
In eq. (2), p’ is a row vector of parameters corresponding to the Z vector. 
In estimating eq. (2) we have used both the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and the instrumental variable (IV) methods. The former method has been 
shown to be robust to specification error but it may suffer from inconsistency 
if regressors are endogenous. The IV procedure is consistent and preferable 
in the presence of errors in variables. However, depending on the availability 
of instruments, it may generate less efficient estimates. 
4. Empirical results 
An important contribution of this study is that it provides estimates of the 
effects of various forms of participation together with those of unionization. 
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Other studies have focused exclusively on individual participation variables 
or on the effect of unionization. As such, they may have suffered from 
omitted variables bias and led to misleading conclusions. Another special 
aspect of our study is that we examine the effects of both general and specific 
forms of participation. Accordingly, we estimate eq. (2) with both the general 
participation variable (PARTICIPATION), which captures the effect of the 
existence of a participation scheme, and with variables that capture the 
effects of worker participation in production and/or wage determination 
(PART PROD and PART WAGES). 
In general, our estimates are sensitive to both the regression specification 
and the regression methodology (OLS vs. IV). This implies that previous 
results in this area may have led to false conclusions with respect to the 
impact of the alternative forms of participation studied here. In particular, 
the significance of the effects of profit-sharing and employee ownership 
depends on the regression specification, while the significance of the general 
participation variable depends upon the regression methodology. We note, 
however, that the impact of participation in wages is independent of the 
regression methodology. 
As the results in tables 2 and 3 indicate, profit-sharing has a positive effect, 
although the coefficient is statistically significant only in the specification 
with the general participation variable [column (l)]. Our results are hence 
consistent with other studies [e.g., Jones and Svejnar (1985)] which find the 
effects of profit-sharing to be positive. The specification which results in a 
significant coefficient on profit-sharing implies that profit-sharing firms with 
no other forms of participation are about 32% more productive than firms 
which do not have profit-sharing. However, our findings suggest that the 
significance of the profit sharing variable may depend on the extent to which 
the other participation variables are specified in the equation. 
Our study is the first to specify the participation variable in a more 
detailed way and thus raises the possibility that the strong positive effect of 
profit-sharing found in the earlier studies and replicated here may have been 
due to the inability to control adequately for the effect of specific types of 
worker participation in decision-making. Particularly, the implication of our 
results is that workers’ ability to influence their own incomes, which is clearly 
correlated with the existence of profit-sharing but which is a broader 
category, may have driven the profit-sharing effect achieved in previous 
studies. Note that under profit-sharing the extent to which workers have a 
say over their own incomes is rather limited. Our results suggest that in 
companies which have profit-sharing programs there exist other programs as 
well under which workers can influence their own incomes, and it is these 
programs which lead to productivity gains. 
The effect of the presence of worker participation, as captured by the 
PARTICIPATION variable, is insignificant in the OLS regression, but 
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Table 2 
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OLS estimates of a translog production function with industry 
fixed effects. 












































































positive and significant in the IV specification. The IV regression coefficient 
of 0.380 on participation suggests that firms with worker participation in 
decision-making are approximately 46% more productive than firms without 
such schemes, ceteris paribus. Schemes that accord workers the right to 
participate in decisions over wages are found to have a strong positive effect 
in all specifications. In contrast, the effect of participation in production 
decisions is not significantly different from zero. The estimates therefore 
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Table 3 
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suggest that participation is likely to have a positive overall effect, but that 
this effect is especially strong in those situations where workers have some 
control over wage determination. Moreover, allowing workers to participate 
in production decisions does not seem to generate productivity gains. 
However, the latter result may reflect the low incidence of this type of 
participation in our sample. (The mean of P,4RTPROD in the sample is 
0.03.) 
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The sensitivity of the estimated impact of the general participation variable 
to the regression methodology is an important aspect of our findings. Most 
previous studies have found that participation in decision-making does 
positively influence productivity. However, several of these studies have 
found the impact to be insignificant. On the basis of our results, it appears 
that the latter findings might reflect the conditions leading to the adoption of 
participative management programs in the samples which lead to those 
results. For example, it is not unusual for firms which have experienced 
difficult times to adopt a more participative decision-making structure. Our 
results suggest that these prior conditions may have been insufficiently 
controlled for in estimating the effect of participative decision-making. 
Our estimates relating to ownership also differ somewhat in the OLS and 
IV procedures. While the OLS estimates suggest that ownership has a 
negative effect on productivity, the IV coefficients indicate that small 
amounts of ownership may have a positive effect. In particular, while the 
coefficients on DIRECT OWN and ESOT are negative and significant in all 
specifications, the effect of not having any employee ownership (NO 0 WN) is 
negative and significant in columns (2) and (3) of table 3. This implies that 
having a small amount of employee ownership affects productivity positively. 
However, this positive effect of having some employee ownership diminishes 
as the percent of non-managerial ownership increases. Our results imply that 
a program of non-managerial direct employee ownership at the sample mean 
diminishes productivity by about 17x, ceteris paribus, while an ESOP which 
holds the sample mean fraction of company stock increases productivity by 
about 9%. 
A factor which may affect our estimate of the impact of direct ownership is 
that the firms in our sample with large amounts of direct ownership are 
concentrated in a single industry (plywood and veneer production). It may be 
that the negative coefficient on direct ownership reflects characteristics of 
that industry in the years for which we have data rather than the influence of 
direct ownership, per se. We intend to explore this possibility in future work. 
Additionally, in connection with the above result for firms with direct 
employee ownership, it is important to note that most companies with large 
amounts of direct employee ownership also have programs for employee 
participation in decision-making. Hence, our results allow for the possibility 
that firms which have substantial direct share ownership and which simul- 
taneously place emphasis on employee decision-making rights (worker co- 
operatives, for example) may be more productive than firms which have 
neither direct employee ownership nor employee participation in decision- 
making. 
The estimated effect of unionization is positive but the significance of the 
estimates varies with the specification of the participation effect. The effect is 
significant when participation is measured as the presence of any scheme 
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[column (l)] or as the presence of a scheme that allows worker participation 
in wage decisions. However, it becomes insignificant when participation is 
measured as control over both wage and production decisions. Our results 
indicate that the presence of various participatory schemes needs to be taken 
into account when evaluating the effects of unionization. Moreover, since the 
nature of union activities tends to be different in participatory than in 
traditional firms [see, e.g., Sockell (1983)] our results suggest hat more in- 
depth institutional research on the role of unions in different types of firms is 
needed. 
5. Concluding observations 
Our empirical findings contribute to the growing literature on the effects of 
employee participation schemes and trade unionism on productive efficiency. 
Our main findings suggest that firms that offer workers participation in 
management tend to be more productive ones, ceteris paribus. When 
controlling for endogeneity of regressors, the impact of employee ownership 
depends on the amount of ownership. This implies that there is an ‘optimal’ 
amount of non-managerial employee ownership (if the goal is solely technical 
efficiency). Also when controlling for endogeneity the presence of profit- 
sharing does not appear to affect productivity, in contrast with previous 
findings. Our results support previous findings on the positive efficiency 
impact of unionization, but indicate that this result is sensitive to regression 
specification. 
The positive effect of participation in management gives important support 
to the proponents of these schemes. This is especially so since the existing 
studies have found the effect to be non-negative but at times insignificant. 
The dependence of our results on regression specification and regression 
methodology implies that omitted variables bias and endogeneity are impor- 
tant issues in the estimation of the impact of employee participation schemes. 
Our results cast doubt on the validity of some previously achieved results in 
this area, although we do not claim the results achieved here to be definitive. 
Rather, we suggest that further study be given to the impact of employee 
participation with emphasis on covariation in the alternative ways that 
employees may be included in the organizational structure of the workplace. 
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